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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to the Utah Const, art. VIII# § 3, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1953, as amended). This matter has been transferred to 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) 
(1953, as amended), and Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the court erred in finding that the method used 
by North Park Village Cooperative ("North Park") in foreclosing 
the interests of Rhodes and Nalder was commercially reasonable. 
The standard of review is the "clearly erroneous" standard 
to the extent that the court's ruling is a finding of fact. The 
standard of review is the "correctness" standard to the extent 
that the court's finding is a conclusion of law. Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether North Park's method of repossessing the leases 
of the other plaintiffs, and leasing of the apartment units dur-
ing the pendency of this lawsuit in mitigation of its damages, 
precludes judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgments. 
The standard of review is the "clearly erroneous" standard 
to the extent that the court's ruling is a finding of fact. The 
standard of review is the "correctness" standard to the extent 
that the court's finding is a conclusion of law. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
North Park believes that Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-9-504 and 
-507(2) are determinative of the first issue relating to the 
foreclosure of the interests of Rhodes and Nalder. Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-9-505(2) is determinative of the second issue. These 
statutes are reproduced in Appendix 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Naiture of the Case and Disposition Below. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed in May of 1988.l The 
plaintiffs sought cancellation of the proprietary leases and 
promissory notes, and rescission of the transactions, and also 
alleged breach of contract, failure to account for rents 
received, mismanagement, fraud and misrepresentation, conspiracy 
and a failure of consideration. North Park counterclaimed 
against the plaintiffs that had defaulted on their promissory 
notes and proprietary leases. This matter was tried before the 
Second District Court, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, without 
a jury, on September 18 and 19, 1991. 
On October 25, 1991, the trial court issued its decision 
finding against plaintiffs, no cause of action, on all of their 
claims, and finding for North Park on its counterclaim. Judge 
*Prior to trial, North Park settled with some of the 
original plaintiffs. Since trial, and as of the date hereof, 
North Park has settled with all of the remaining plaintiffs and 
appellants except for Rhodes, Nalder, the Miyatakes, the 
Hunsakers, the Tanners, and Shahidinejad. 
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Cornaby then issued Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
(reproduced in Appendix 2) and entered Judgment against plain-
tiffs and in favor of North Park on January 8, 1992. 
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court on February 6, 1992. The Utah Supreme Court poured-over 
the case to the Court of Appeals on June 22, 1992. 
Plaintiffs have raised no argument on appeal regarding the 
correctness of the trial court's ruling on the complaint. The 
issues on appeal involve only the defendant's right to recover on 
the counterclaim. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Prior to 1980, Gregland Investment ("Gregland") had built 
and was operating a 72 unit apartment complex in North Salt Lake 
City, Utah. R. 704.2 In approximately early 1980, Gregland 
decided to form a cooperative apartment project, which was called 
North Park Village Cooperative. R. 704. Although the idea of a 
cooperative apartment complex is relatively new to Utah, coopera-
tives have been successfully used on the East Coast. R. 705. 
On April 8, 1980, North Park entered into a "Proprietary 
Lease" with Gregland (Exhibit P-2), pursuant to which the 72 
dwelling units comprising the apartment complex were leased to 
North Park by Gregland, as and when North Park was able to 
2As to those facts not at issue on appeal, reference is 
typically made to the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, R. 703-714. 
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sublease each unit to a member. R. 705. The purchase price 
payable to Gregland by North Park for the Proprietary Lease was 
$35,000 per unit, payable either in cash or on terms. R. 705. 
North Park marketed proprietary leases to prospective mem-
bers of the cooperative. R. 705. Each purchaser of a proprie-
tary lease received a membership stock certificate and was 
subject to the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and rules and 
regulations of the cooperative. R. 705-06. 
Each of the plaintiffs or plaintiff couples acquired a 
proprietary lease. R. 706. Most acquired their leases directly 
from North Park, although several plaintiffs acquired them from 
previous owners. R. 706. Each of the plaintiffs signed a 
promissory note in favor of North Park, or assumed liability for 
payment of a promissory note, representing the balance of the 
purchase price owed to North Park for the proprietary lease. R. 
706. 
The promissory notes were secured by the proprietary leases 
cicquired by the plaintiffs. Each of the notes contained the 
following provision: 
SECURITY - for this promissory note shall be a 
collateral pledge of a certain proprietary farm lease 
and its resulting leasehold provided by Northpark 
Village Coop for Unit # . Repossession of the 
collateral above and resulting resale may not satisfy 
this note and in that case a deficiency judgment may be 
sought against the payee [sic] for additional sums for 
satisfaction of this note and costs. Upon satisfaction 
of the sums described herein, the security shall be 
reassigned to the payee [sic]. 
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Each of the plaintiffs, except those settling prior to 
trial, ceased making payments to North Park on their notes and 
failed to pay maintenance fees due under the proprietary leases, 
R. 708, 710. In each case, North Park sent notices of termina-
tion to the plaintiffs, the basic form of which was as follows: 
NOTICE OF TERMINATION 
To: (Unit Holder and Address) 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you are in default under 
the terms of your Proprietary Lease due to your failure 
to pay sums due under the Proprietary Lease and 
Promissory Note. As of the date of this Notice, 
monthly carrying charges in the amount of $ , 
and lease payments in the amount of $ are 
due and owing to North Park Village Cooperative. 
You are further given notice that your Proprietary 
Lease and all of your rights under that Agreement will 
expire ten (10) days after service of this Notice on 
you, unless, in the meantime, your defaults under this 
Agreement have been cured. Should these defaults not 
be cured and this Agreement expire, you will be deemed 
a tenant at will and are further given notice to remove 
yourself from the premises. 
This Notice is given pursuant to Article 14 of the 
Proprietary Lease between you and North Park Village 
Cooperative. 
DATED this day of , 19 . 
NORTH PARK VILLAGE COOPERATIVE 
BY 
R. 708; Tr. 149, 243, 280. 
In January of 1988, North Park decided to foreclose on many 
of the plaintiffs' proprietary leases by public sale (not all 
were in default). Notices of the sale were sent to each of the 
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plaintiffs, including Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder. R. 709; Tr. at 
353. Rhodes and Nalder received the Notice of Public Sale, 
together with a letter advising them of the sale and their right 
to redeem the collateral at any time prior to the sale. R. 53, 
139-145, 151; Tr. at 244. The Notice of Public Sale (Ex. D-5) 
was also published in the Davis County Clipper for three consecu-
tive weeks on January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1988. 
R. 709. Prior to the scheduled sale, North Park's management and 
board of directors received reports and communications from 
various parties claiming that the proposed sales were improper. 
Tr. at 343-44, 356-57. North Park decided to proceed with the 
sale of only the cooperative apartment unit of Randy Rhodes and 
Scott Nalder, basically as a test. Tr. at 344. 
Mr. Rhodes was in attendance at the public sale. Tr. at 
244. The sale was conducted by public auction. North Park was 
the successful bidder, acquiring the proprietary lease for the 
sum of $26,500. R. 709. Mr. Gregerson testified, and the trial 
court held, that the bid amount was the fair market value of the 
cooperative cipartment unit at the time of the sale. Tr. at 346, 
R. 710. 
When this lawsuit was later brought in May of 19 88, North 
Park counterclaimed for the amounts owed on the notes and for 
judicial foreclosure of the proprietary leases remaining as 
collateral. With respect to Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder, North 
Park sought a judgment on the promissory note, after application 
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of the proceeds of the public sale, in the sum of $7,328.48, plus 
interest and attorneys' fees. R. 43-146. In their Reply to 
Counterclaim, the plaintiffs denied they were in default on the 
notes or leases. R. 150. 
After default and after having sent the notices of termina-
tion, North Park took steps to mitigate its damages as a result 
of plaintiffs' defaults by collecting rents and renting plain-
tiffs' units to third parties. Such efforts continued during the 
pendency of this action until the trial court ruled for North 
Park below. R. 709. From the rental proceeds, North Park 
collected its rental costs, including a monthly maintenance fee, 
as well as other costs of its mitigation efforts, such as clean-
ing, advertising, etc. Tr. at 356. R. 709. In each instance, 
the monthly maintenance fees and other rental costs were recouped 
from rents generated from North Park's mitigation efforts, 
resulting in a net benefit to the plaintiffs from North Park's 
mitigation efforts. R. 709. In calculating its damages at 
trial, North Park gave plaintiffs credit for those net benefits 
achieved through its mitigation efforts. Ex. D-7; Tr. at 310. 
The trial court found against the plaintiffs on the 
Complaint, no cause of action, and held that North Park was 
entitled to recover on the notes. As to the foreclosure of the 
proprietary lease of Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder, the court found 
that the sale was a "public sale," which was "in all material 
respects conducted in a commercially reasonably manner." R. 709, 
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712, As to the other plaintiffs, the judgment provided that 
their proprietary leases would be sold at a sheriff's sale and 
the proceeds of the sale applied against the indebtedness, costs 
of sale and attorneys' fees, R. 715-19. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By this appeal, plaintiffs seek only to avoid deficiency 
judgments on the promissory notes. Plaintiffs Rhodes and Nalder 
assert that North Park failed to conduct the public sale in a 
"commercially reasonable manner," thus barring a deficiency 
judgment. That argument fails for two reasons. First, the trial 
court concluded after hearing the evidence, that the sale of 
Messrs. Rhodes' and Nalder's Proprietary Lease was a public sale, 
"in all material respects conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner." The Court's conclusion is based upon substantial 
evidence, unrefuted at trial, that Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder 
received personal notice of the sale, the sale wais advertised for 
three consecutive weeks in the Davis County Clipper, a newspaper 
of general circulation in the county where the property was 
located, Mr. Rhodes was present at the sale, and the sale was 
conducted by public auction. Second, plaintiffs Rhodes and 
Nalder suffered no damage, loss, or prejudice even if the proce-
dure was defective, since North Park bought the collateral at the 
foreclosure sale for its fair market value. 
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The remaining plaintiffs assert that no deficiency judgment 
may be taken against them due to alleged irregularities in North 
Park's actions in giving notices of termination and in leasing 
the units pending a judicial decision. The plaintiffs assert 
that by reason of North Park's actions, the collateral somehow 
became worthless, or that North Park should be deemed to have 
accepted the collateral in full satisfaction of the notes. 
The plaintiffs' arguments fail for several reasons. First, 
the notices of termination did not make the collateral worthless 
or impair their values in any respect, but merely terminated the 
plaintiffs' right to use and occupancy of the premises as a 
preliminary step to North Park's realizing upon its collateral 
through resale. After judgment, the leases could be sold and 
conveyed to the purchasers at the Sheriff's sales. Second, North 
Park never provided plaintiffs with written notice of its 
intention to retain the proprietary leases in satisfaction of 
plaintiffs' debts, as Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-505(2) requires. 
Third, North Park's operation of the apartment units during the 
pendency of this lawsuit was an appropriate and beneficial effort 
to mitigate its damages. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
SALE OF MESSRS. RHODES' AND NALDER'S PROPRIE-
TARY LEASE WAS CONDUCTED IN A COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE MANNER. 
The public sale of the proprietary lease of Messrs. Rhodes 
and Nalder was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. 
The undisputed evidence was that Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder 
received personal written notice of the sale. The sale was 
advertised for three consecutive weeks in the Davis County 
Clipper, a newspaper of general circulation in Davis County, the 
county in which the property is situated, basically in the manner 
required for sales under trust deeds. 
Mr. Rhodes was in attendance at the sale. The sale occurred 
at North Park and was conducted by public auction. North Park 
acquired the collateral for a bid of $26,500, which the trial 
court found was the fair market value of the collateral on the 
date of sale. In presenting that evidence, North Park met its 
burden of establishing that the sale was conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable manner, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-504 (1953). FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 
P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) (secured party has burden of proving 
sale was commercially reasonable). 
Notwithstanding that evidence, plaintiffs assert on appeal 
that the sale was not commercially reasonable. Plaintiffs, 
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however, refer to no evidence to contradict the foregoing facts. 
They only assert that the notice of sale was not designed to 
attract purchasers "because each successful bidder was required 
to execute the proprietary lease purchased and be bound by its 
terms, including the obligation to pay monthly maintenance fees 
in perpetuity." Appellants' Br. pp. 13-14. 
The notices of sale, however, accurately described what was 
for sale, i.e., a proprietary lease, which contained certain 
obligations that the purchaser would be bound to, including the 
obligation to pay maintenance fees. It would be totally anoma-
lous to suggest that the notice of sale was deficient because it 
accurately described the collateral to be sold. 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has described a public sale 
for commercial reasonableness purposes, as follows: 
A public sale after default "has traditionally meant 'a 
sale in which the public, upon proper notice is invited 
to participate and given full opportunity to bid upon a 
competitive basis for the property placed on sale, 
which is sold to the highest bidder.'" The requirement 
of a public invitation is essential for a public sale 
under the Uniform Commercial Code. It is fundamental 
that a public sale presupposes posting public notices 
or advertising. The Restatement of Security § 48, 
Comment (1941) defines a public sale as "one to which 
the public is invited by advertisement to appear and 
bid at auction for the goods to be sold." 
Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc. v. Glaubensklee. 649 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 
1982) (citations omitted). 
In Pioneer Dodge, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court's holding that the sale of a truck was commercially 
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reasonable because the only efforts to obtain buyers consisted of 
taking the truck to a few car lots and obtaining oral bids of 
undisclosed amounts; placing the truck on the a car lot for a few 
days; and announcing the sale over the dealer's loudspeaker 
immediately prior thereto. Id. at 31. 
Similarly, in FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 
803 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that a sale of 
equipment Wcis not commercially reasonable where the secured party 
did not advertise the sale, but only contacted three dealers of 
which one had no intent to make a serious bid and the other two 
bid almost as low as the first, in order to resell the equipment 
for a profit. The result was that the equipment was sold for an 
amount which was less than one-half of the amount of the secured 
party's own appraisal completed just a few months before. 
The facts in this case stand in stark contraist to those set 
forth in Pioneer Dodge and FMA Financial Corp. Here, the sale was 
advertised for three consecutive weeks in the Davis County 
Clipper. That is the same form of published notice required to be 
provided in ai trust deed foreclosure proceeding or in execution 
sales of real estate pursuant to Rule 69 (e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Moreover, the sale was conducted by public auction. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-507(2) (1953) (a sale in conformity 
with usual manner and practice is commercially reasonable). 
The facts in this case are similar to those in Brigham Truck 
and Implement Co. v. Fridall, 746 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1987). In 
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Brigham Truck, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's 
entry of a deficiency judgment after a resale of the collateral 
where the secured party provided actual written notice to the 
debtor and advertised the sale on the radio and in the Box Elder 
News and Journal for two consecutive weeks and The Leader, a 
Tremonton newspaper, also for two weeks. 
Even if the court were to consider North Park's efforts to 
advertise the property as deficient, however, North Park proved 
that Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder suffered no loss as a result, 
since the collateral sold for its fair value. As stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Brigham Truck: "Of primary importance are 
the secured party's attempts to obtain a fair price for the 
collateral by advertising the collateral or otherwise notifying 
potential buyers that the collateral is for sale." Id. at 1172 
(citing Haggis Management Inc. v. Turtle Management, 745 P.2d 442 
(Utah 1985) (emphasis added)). In this case, North Park bought 
the proprietary lease of Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder at the sale 
for $26,500, the undisputed fair market value of the proprietary 
lease at the time of the sale. Because the amount paid for the 
proprietary lease at the sale equals the fair market value 
thereof, plaintiffs were in no way prejudiced by the manner in 
which the sale occurred. 
In Security State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469 (Utah 
1987), the debtor sought a reversal of a deficiency judgment 
against him in favor of Security State Bank. Debtor claimed that 
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the bank's notice was technically deficient because the sale was 
held after the date stated in the notice. That technical defici-
ency notwithstanding, the Utah Supreme Court sustained the trial 
court's entry of a deficiency judgment, noting that the debtor 
had shown no prejudice or harm suffered from the delay in the 
sale. "Indeed, the evidence presented by the bank indicates that 
the debtor was advantaged by the late sale because the bank was 
able to achieve an unusually high price, more than $1,000 over 
blue book value, for the truck by waiting to sell it." Id. at 
47. See also Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Utah 
1985) (notwithstanding deficient notices of sale, deficiency 
judgment affirmed because collateral was sold for $2,000 more 
than a bid approved by the debtor); Chrysler Dodge Country v. 
Curley, 782 P.2d 536, 542 (Utah App. 1989) (notwithstanding no 
advertising of sale, deficiency judgment affirmed because "the 
selling price was higher than the price Chrysler Dodge had 
arrived at after using N.A.D.A. pricing book and other price 
factors") . 
As in Security State Bank, Scharf and Chrysler Dodge 
Country, North Park paid an objectively fair price for the pro-
prietary lease. The payment of that fair market value by North 
Park at the foreclosure sale conclusively establishes that the 
purpose of the commercially reasonable standard has been met. 
Because there is substantial evidence to support the find-
ings and conclusions of the trial court with respect to the sale 
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of the proprietary lease of Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder, and 
because plaintiffs neither cite nor refer to any evidence or case 
law that would controvert those findings and conclusions, the 
judgment against Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder should be affirmed. 
II 
NORTH PARK'S REPOSSESSION AND MITIGATION 
EFFORTS DO NOT PRECLUDE NORTH PARK FROM 
JUDICIALLY FORECLOSING PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS 
AND OBTAINING A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS. 
The plaintiffs allege on appeal that actions by North Park, 
as well as the lengthy pendency of this action, somehow rendered 
the collateral for the notes worthless, thus barring a deficiency 
judgment in favor of North Park.3 As the procedure followed and 
notices given by North Park in pursuance of a recovery on the 
collateral did not impair the collateral or prejudice plaintiffs 
in any respect, plaintiffs' defense should be rejected. 
Preliminary to seeking to recover on the collateral pledged 
for the notes, North Park was obliged to take possession of the 
collateral in some fashion. The proprietary leases specified, in 
Article 14, that a ten day notice and opportunity to cure was 
required. North Park gave such notice through the notices of 
termination. 
3Plaintiffs' argument that the notices of termination 
somehow made the collateral worthless was not raised as a defense 
to the counterclaim or listed as a contested issue in the 
pretrial order. R. 147-52, 636-38. The argument first appears 
in Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief. R. 605-610. 
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Plaintiffs' assertion that the notices of termination in 
some way impaired the collateral (the proprietary leases) misses 
the mark. The notices did not extinguish the proprietary leases, 
but rather only terminated the plaintiff's right to use and 
occupancy of the premises as a preliminary step to North Park's 
realizing upon its collateral through resale. Further, the 
notices of termination did not relinquish any claims, and did not 
destroy or impair North Park's ability to resell the proprietary 
leases. 
Article 14 of the proprietary leases, referred to in the 
notices of termination, specifically provides for the notices of 
termination and grants North Park, after such termination, a 
right "to repossess." Article 14 neither expressly nor impliedly 
waives any claim North Park may have to collect on the promissory 
notes or past due maintenance fees. Article 14 also states that 
the relationship is that of landlord and tenant, further buttres-
sing North Park's right, and obligation, to obtain "possession" 
of the leasehold before trying to realize upon the collateral. 
Clearly, North Park could not foreclose on the leases without 
first obtaining possessory rights. C£. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12 
(1953) (willful exclusion of tenant without judicial process 
prohibited). 
In addition, each promissory note states that it is secured 
by the proprietary lease and provides for "repossession," 
"resulting resale," and the ability to obtain a "deficiency 
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judgment" thereafter. It is therefore apparent from the docu-
ments, construed together (as the plaintiffs at trial asserted 
they should be), that the notices of termination were merely a 
step in the repossession and resale process.4 
Furthermore, as a practical matter, there has been no 
impairment of the collateral. Except for the Rhodes and Nalder 
lease, none of the proprietary leases was disposed of prior to 
judgment. There is no evidence that the proprietary leases could 
not therefore be transferred to purchasers at the execution sales 
ordered by the trial court. There is also no evidence that the 
values of the leases are any less than they otherwise would be 
but for some act of North Park. 
Plaintiffs' position is contrary to this court's 
observation: 
Where questions arise in the interpretation of an 
agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the 
document itself, and it should be looked at in its 
entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of 
its parts should be given effect insofar as that is 
possible. 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 
1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). If plaintiffs' interpretation of the 
several agreements is correct, such that the proprietary leases 
truly were extinguished, then all of the provisions of the 
agreements relating to North Park's security interest would be 
4Plaintiffs' complaint itself acknowledges that the leases 
were still extant; otherwise, plaintiffs would not have requested 
rescission of the transactions. 
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nullified. Completely nullifying the security aspects of the 
agreements was not the intent of the parties. 
Plaintiffs also suggest that North Park has retained the 
units in satisfaction of its claims, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-505 (1953), which sets forth the procedure for a secured 
party to propose retention of collateral in satisfaction and 
discharge of a debt. The statute provides that a secured party 
may elect to retain collateral in satisfaction of an obligation 
by submitting a proposal to that effect to the debtor in writing, 
to which the debtor may object. North Park never provided any 
written notice to plaintiffs proposing to retain the proprietary 
leases in satisfaction of the debts; furthermore, the notices of 
termination cannot be construed as such since they did not pro-
pose any relinquishment or satisfaction of claims, and did not 
destroy or impair North Park's ability to resell the proprietary 
leases. There is nothing in the notices of termination or in 
North Park's actions or inaction, including its mitigation 
efforts before and during the pendency of this action, expressly 
or impliedly manifesting an intent to retain the collateral in 
satisfaction of the debt. See IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 776 
P.2d 607 (Utah 1989). 
Plaintiffs' assertion that North Park operated the coopera-
tive apartment units as its own is a simple mislabeling of North 
Park's efforts to mitigate its damages. North Park simply col-
lected rents and attempted to lease the units to third parties. 
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As rents were collected and when cooperative apartment units were 
leased by North Park through its mitigation efforts, North Park 
credited plaintiffs for those rents in order to offset the main-
tenance fees accruing under the proprietary leases, and to pay 
rental expenses incurred. 
From the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that North Park 
never intended to accept the repossessed proprietary leases in 
full satisfaction of the amounts owing under the proprietary 
leases and the promissory notes. The District Court did not err 
in awarding North Park its judicial sale remedy and right to 
deficiency judgments against plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, North Park respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court, and to 
remand for the purpose of fixing the amount of attorneys' fees to 
be awarded defendant in connection with this appeal. 
DATED this ^ day of July, 1992. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Bryce Dy Panzer 
David wC^Steffensen 
Attorneys for Appellee 
(Original Signature) 
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Appendix 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504: 
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease 
or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in 
its then condition or following any commercially 
reasonable preparation or processing. 
* * * 
(2) If the security interest secures an indebt-
edness, the secured party must account to the debtor 
for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the 
debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the 
underlying transaction was the sale of accounts or 
chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or 
is liable for any deficiency only if the security 
agreement so provides. 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by 
public or private proceedings and may be made by way of 
one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may 
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place 
and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition 
including the method, manner, time, place and terms 
must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is 
perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or 
is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, 
reasonable notification of the time and place of any 
public sale or reasonable notification of the time 
after which any private sale or other intended dispo-
sition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party 
to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a 
statement renouncing or modifying his right to notifi-
cation of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other 
notification need be sent. . . . A secured party may 
buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a 
type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a 
type which is the subject of widely distributed stan-
dard price quotations, he may buy at a private sale. 
* * • 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-505(2): 
In any other case involving consumer goods or any 
other collateral, a secured party in possession may, 
after default, propose to retain the collateral in 
satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such 
a proposal shall be sent to the debtor if he has not 
signed after default a statement renouncing or modify-
ing his rights under this section. In the case of 
consumer goods no other notice need be given. In other 
cases notice shall be sent to any other secured party 
from whom the secured party has received (before 
sending his notice to the debtor or before the debtor's 
renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim 
of an interest in the collateral. If the secured party 
receives objection in writing from a person entitled to 
receive notification within twenty-one days after the 
notice was sent, the secured party must dispose of the 
collateral under § 70A-9-504. In the absence of such 
written objection secured party may retain the collat-
eral in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-507(2): 
The fact that a better price could have been 
obtained by a sale at a different time or in a differ-
ent method from that selected by the secured party is 
not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was 
not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the 
secured party either sells the collateral in the usual 
manner in any recognized market therefore or if he 
sells at the price current in such market at the time 
of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity 
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in 
the type of property sold he has sold in a commercially 
reasonable manner. The principles stated in the two 
proceeding sections with respect to sales also apply as 
may be appropriate to other types of disposition. A 
disposition which has been approved in any judicial 
proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or 
representative of creditors shall conclusively be 
deemed to be commercially reasonable, but this section 
does not indicate that any such approval must be 
obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any 
disposition not so approved is not commercially 
reasonable. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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BRYCE D. PANZER (A2509) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY L. RHODES, SCOTT N. 
NALDER, FAYE COLTON (MOORE), 
SEAN MOORE, JAMES D. OVENDEN, 
DONNA McQUISTON (OVENDEN), 
ROLAND and ALISON TANNER, M.D. 
and JOLENE S. SWENSEN, HERBERT 
and HARRIET GOLDMAN, GREG and 
BRENDA MIYATAKE, RALPH and 
JOYCE FRASIER, MARK C. and 
JOYCE K. HUNSAKER, LANDON and 
MARIE MORRELL, ZOHREH 
SHAHIDINEJAD, DENNIS F. and 
SHARON F. REEVES, BRIAN 
CARMACK, BEN J. and CHERYL 
HEROLD, THOMAS and KAROL PACE, 
and CONNIE PARKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE NORTH PARK VILLAGE 
COOPERATIVE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 43583 
Judge Cornaby 
This action came on for trial before the above-entitled 
court on September 18 and 19, 1991, the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby, District Court Judge, presiding. Bryce E. Roe and 
Kathleen H. Switzer of Fabian and Clendenin appeared on behalf of 
the plaintiffs, and Bryce D. Panzer of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau appeared on behalf of the defendant. Witnesses were 
sworn and examined, and the Court had an opportunity to observe 
their demeanor and credibility. Exhibits and stipulations of 
counsel were also received into evidence. The Court issued a 
written decision on the matter on October 25, 1991. The Court 
now makes and enters the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Gregland Investments ("Gregland") is ci partnership of 
S. Arthur Gregerson, his wife, Montess, and their five children. 
Prior to 1980, Gregland had built and was operating a seventy-two 
unit apartment complex in North Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Gregland executed a Deed of Trust on the apartment 
complex to Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company (Exhibit D-l) to 
secure a Promissory Note in the original amount of $825,000, 
dated May 14, 1979 (Exhibit P-7). 
3. In approximately early 1980, Gregland decided to form a 
cooperative apartment project, as a means of selling the 
apartments without activating the due-on-sale clause contained in 
the Trust Deed to Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company. 
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4. Although the idea of a cooperative apartment complex is 
relatively new to Utah, cooperatives have been successfully used 
on the East Coast. 
5. On April 8, 1980, North Park Village Cooperative 
("NPVC") entered into a "Proprietary Lease" with Gregland 
(Exhibit P-2). 
6. S. Arthur Gregerson, Montess Gregerson# and Gene Curtis 
executed and filed Articles of Incorporation for NPVC with the 
State of Utah, and a Certificate of Incorporation for NPVC was 
issued May 22, 1980 (Exhibit P-l). 
7. Pursuant to the Proprietary Lease between Gregland and 
NPVC, dated April 8, 1980, the seventy-two dwelling units 
comprising NPVC were leased to NPVC by Gregland, as and when NPVC 
was able to sublease each unit to a member. 
8. The purchase price payable by NPVC for the Proprietary 
Lease was $35,000 per unit, payable either in cash or over time. 
The Proprietary Lease also stated that payments and payoffs would 
be figured on a per unit basis. 
9. Pursuant to the Proprietary Lease, NPVC was entitled to 
acquire the property upon payment in full of the amounts owed for 
the Proprietary Lease, plus $1.00. 
10. NPVC marketed proprietary leases to prospective members 
of the cooperative. Each purchaser of a proprietary lease was to 
receive a membership stock certificate. Each unit leaseholder 
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was subject to the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, and Rules 
and Regulations of NPVC. 
11. Each of the plaintiffs or plaintiff couples acquired a 
proprietary lease from NPVC. Most of the plaintiffs acquired 
their proprietary leases from NPVC directly, although several of 
the plaintiffs acquired them from other owners. 
12. Each of the plaintiffs signed a promissory note in 
favor of NPVC, representing the balance of the purchase price 
owed to NPVC for the proprietary lease. In those instances where 
a unit was purchased from previous owners, the plaintiff assumed 
the previous owners' liability on a promissory note. 
13. Each plaintiff that testified conceded that he or she 
was aware from inception that a cooperative apartment unit, and 
not a condominium, was being purchased, or that he or she read 
the proprietary lease in question before signing the documents. 
14. In any event, all of the plaintiffs knew, or reasonably 
should have known, more than three years prior to the initiation 
of this action, that they had acquired proprietary leases in a 
cooperative apartment project, and not condominiums. 
15. At a special stockholders meeting of NPVC held on 
July 21, 1984, the members of NPVC specifically authorized NPVC 
to grant an easement to Gregland for access to an adjacent parcel 
upon which Gregland intended to construct an apartment complex. 
The formal document representing the easement was subsequently 
executed by both Gregland and NPVC. The cooperative's members 
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conditioned the grant of the easement on Gregland agreeing to 
repair any damage done to the roadway, to the satisfaction of 
NPVC, and Gregland providing for compensation to NPVC in the form 
of a right to use amenities valued at $57,000 to be constructed 
by Gregland. The resolution authorizing the grant of the ease-
ment was approved by a vote of the members, 51 to 3. 
16. There was no evidence at trial that the grant of the 
easement or the maintenance and operation of the apartment 
complex constructed by Gregland on the adjacent property in any 
way harmed or damaged the plaintiffs or constituted a breach of 
the proprietary leases. 
17. NPVC did not have the financial ability to finance or 
build Phase 2 or Phase 3 of the originally proposed 198 units. 
18. Rather than diminishing the value of the cooperative 
apartment units, the construction and operation of the apartments 
by Gregland enhanced the value of the cooperative units and 
provided additional amenities for use by the members. 
19. Although the plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that 
NPVC had mismanaged the cooperative, or had failed to account for 
rent collected from the plaintiffs' tenants, there was no 
material evidence at trial supporting these allegations. 
20. The proprietary leases provided for any transfer of 
ownership of a lease to be approved by the Board of Directors of 
NPVC. Although some transferees were apparently turned down due 
to poor credit, there was no evidence that NPVC either prevented 
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a transfer by any of the plaintiffs or imposed any unreasonable 
conditions upon a transfer. There was no evidence that any 
plaintiff lost an opportunity to sell his or her cooperative 
apartment unit by reason of any provision in the proprietary 
leases, the existence of the Gregland/NPVC Proprietary Lease, or 
the first Trust Deed in favor of Boston Mutual. 
21. The first Trust Deed in favor of Boston Mutual has 
never been in default, and the payments made to Gregland by NPVC 
on the Proprietary Lease are sufficient to service that debt. 
22. Although those plaintiffs that attempted to sell their 
cooperative apartment units encountered great difficulty, the 
evidence established that there is a market in the general sense 
for cooperative apartments. During 1980 and 1981, sixty-five of 
the seventy-two units were sold. During the period from 1980 
through 1990, forty-two cooperative apartment units were trans-
ferred by members (excluding transfers by Gregland or NPVC). 
23. Until the plaintiffs defaulted in the payment of their 
promissory notes and maintenance fees, they had the use and 
occupancy of the cooperative apartment units. Except for some 
minor complaints, the plaintiffs' use and occupancy of the 
apartment units had been undisturbed. 
24. Each of the plaintiffs, except those settling prior to 
trial, ceased making payments to NPVC on their promissory notes 
and maintenance fees. In each case, NPVC sent notices of 
termination. 
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!25. Subsequent to the plaintiffs' defaults and after having 
sent the notices of termination, NPVC collected rents from the 
cooperative apartment units and leased the units to third 
parties. 
26. Except for the cooperative apartment unit of Randy 
Rhodes and Scott Nalder, from approximately the time of sending 
the termination notices until trial, NPVC attempted to minimize 
its losses by renting out the plaintiffs' units. In connection 
therewith, NPVC charged a monthly maintenance fees of $90.00 per 
month and other rental costs, such as cleaning, advertising, etc. 
In each instance, the monthly maintenance fees and other rental 
costs were recouped from rent proceeds, resulting in a net 
benefit to the plaintiffs from NPVC's mitigation efforts. 
27. In February of 1988, the proprietary lease pertaining 
to the cooperative apartment unit of Randy Rhodes and Scott 
Nalder was sold at a public sale. 
28. Prior to the public sale, notice of the sale was mailed 
to Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder. 
29. The notice of public sale (defendant's Exhibit 4) was 
also published in the Davis County Clipper on January 27, 
February 3, and February 10, 1988. 
30. At the sale, the proprietary lease pertaining to the 
cooperative apartment unit of Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder was sold 
at a public auction, with NPVC being the successful bidder for 
the sum of $26,500. 
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31. As of the date of the public sale, the fair value of 
the cooperative apartment unit of Messrs. Rhodes and Nalder was 
$26,500. 
32. Plaintiffs defaulted in the payments due on the 
promissory notes and proprietary leases. The amounts owed by 
plaintiffs on their promissory notes and proprietary leases are 
as follows. 
Names 
Randy L. Rhodes & 
Scott N. Nalder 
Faye Colton (Moore) & 
Sean Moore 
Roland & Alison Tanner 
M. D. & Jolene S. Swensen 
Herbert & Harriet Goldman 
Greg & Brenda Miyatake 
Mark C. & Joyce K. Hunsaker 
Zohreh Shahidinejad 
Dennis F. & Sharon F. Reeves 
Ben J. & Cheryl Herold 
Connie Parker 
Amount 
$ 9,579.71 
$46,876.62 
$39,038.39 
$37,604.47 
$34,121.09 
$36,331.05 
$38,955.41 
$60,946.09 
$44,626.82 
$34,413.65 
$27,510.91 
As of 
9/10/91 
9/05/91 
8/06/91 
8/05/91 
8/05/91 
8/06/91 
8/01/91 
8/07/91 
8/09/91 
8/02/91 
8/16/91 
33. The promissory notes and proprietary leases contain 
provisions for the recovery of attorney's fees and collection 
costs in the event of default. 
34. NPVC has incurred reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
by reason of plaintiffs' defaults under the promissory notes and 
leases, in the aggregate sum of $20,814.54, as established by the 
affidavit of defendant's counsel. Of that sum, plaintiffs are 
responsible individually for the following amounts: 
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Names Amount 
Randy L. Rhodes & Scott N. Nalder $ 2,494.94 
Faye Colton (Moore) & Sean Moore $ 1,831.96 
Roland & Alison Tanner $ 1,831.96 
M. D. & Jolene S. Swensen $ 1,831.96 
Herbert & Harriet Goldman $ 1,831.96 
Greg & Brenda Miyatake $ 1,831.96 
Mark C. & Joyce K. Hunsaker $ 1,831.96 
Zohreh Shahidinejad $ 1,831.96 
Dennis F. & Sharon F. Reeves $ 1,831.96 
Ben J. & Cheryl Herold $ 1,831.96 
Connie Parker $ 1,831.96 
TOTAL $20,814.54 
35. The evidence at trial failed to establish any fraud or 
dishonesty in the operation of NPVC by the Gregerson. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To the extent constituting conclusions of law, the 
foregoing findings of facts are incorporated herein. 
2. NPVC did not materially breach or default under the 
terms of the various proprietary leases between NPVC and the 
plaintiffs. 
3. Prior to trial, the claims of Landon and Marie Morrell 
were dismissed. Further, prior to trial, plaintiffs James D. 
Ovenden and Donna McQuiston Ovenden, Ralph and Joyce Frasier, 
Brian Carmack, and Thomas and Karol Pace, entered into settlement 
agreements with NPVC, and their claims against NPVC should be 
dismissed. 
4. The transactions between plaintiffs and NPVC were and 
are supported by good and valuable consideration, and it would 
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not be inequitable to enforce the proprietary leases and 
promissory notes. 
5. The proprietary leases between plaintiffs and defendant 
do not constitute an unreasonable restraint upon alienation, nor 
do the proprietary leases, or the covenants contained therein, 
violate the rule against perpetuities. 
6. The plaintiffs have breached and defaulted on their 
respective promissory notes to NPVC, and on their obligation to 
pay monthly maintenance fees under the proprietciry leases. 
7. Except as to plaintiffs Randy Rhodes amd Scott Nalder, 
NPVC holds, as collateral for amounts owed by plaintiffs to NPVC, 
assignments of the various proprietary leases. 
8. The proprietary lease purchased by Randy Rhodes and 
Scott Nalder was pledged as security for their obligations under 
the promissory note and proprietary lease. 
9. The method of foreclosing on Rhodes and Nalder's 
proprietary lease, including the notice of sale and sale, was 
proper. 
10. The foreclosure of the Rhodes and Nalder's proprietary 
lease was in all material respects conducted in ci commercially 
reasonable manner. 
11. Under the proprietary leases, NPVC had no duty to the 
plaintiffs to construct additional cooperative apartment units; 
furthermore, plaintiffs suffered no damages by reason of NPVC's 
failure to construct additional cooperative apartment units. 
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12. The easement agreement between NPVC and Gregland was 
approved by the members of NPVC, and is supported by good and 
valuable consideration. 
13. Defendant is entitled to a judgment against plaintiffs 
on the Complaint, no cause of action. 
14. Defendant is entitled to judgment against plaintiffs 
(except Rhodes and Nalder) for the amounts set forth in paragraph 
32 above (findings of fact), as of the dates indicated therein, 
interest, and attorney's fees (in the amounts set forth in 
paragraph 34 above (findings of fact)), and for an order of sale 
of the proprietary leases pledged as security for said amounts. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to credit for amounts collected from 
rents from the cooperative apartment units, net of expenses, from 
said dates to the dates of sale. 
15. As to plaintiffs Randy L. Rhodes and Scott N. Nalder, 
NPVC is entitled to judgment for the deficiency owed on the 
promissory note and proprietary leases, after application of the 
proceeds of the foreclosure sale, in the sum of $9,579.71, plus 
interest, and attorneys' fees of $2,494.94. 
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DATED this / day of / 77„ « * r<s # 199^. 
Approved: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Bryce D. Panzer 
Attorney for Defendant 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Bryce E. Roe 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
BDP589 
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